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Is Turkey Still a Reliable Ally? 
The Case of the Black Sea1
Nikolett PÉNZVÁLTÓ2
The study examines Turkish foreign policy in the Black Sea region after the Russian 
annexation of Crimea. It focuses on two main issues: Turkey’s policies within NATO 
and its balancing actions vis-à-vis Russia. The paper concludes that in spite of the 
sporadic Western criticism Ankara is still committed to NATO. Nonetheless, Turkey 
has taken only limited balancing actions to counter the Russian threat. Ankara 
evaluates and prioritizes threats often very differently from its Western partners, 
and considers certain balancing steps ineffective or too costly at a specific moment.
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Introduction
In the past few years, Turkey has often been accused of being an unreliable ally and siding 
with Russia rather than its Western partners. The increasingly authoritarian Turkish 
domestic politics, the bilateral disputes within NATO, the disagreements on the Syrian 
war and Ankara’s plan to procure Russian-made S–400 surface-to-air missile systems have 
strengthened the perception that Turkey’s turning away from the West.
In this paper, the Black Sea was selected as a case study to see if this argument holds 
any merit. After drawing up the theoretical framework and explaining the reasons of the 
selection of the case study, we will examine the Turkish reactions to the Russian annexation 
of Crimea. The study attempts to answer two questions: 1. Is Turkey still a reliable ally 
considering its policies in the Black Sea region? 2. What are the reasons of Turkey’s limited 
balancing actions against Russia in the Black Sea region?
Theoretical Framework: Balancing
As per Kai He, the concept of balancing is operationalized here as “state strategies that 
a state employs to change its relative power vs. its rival’s to its advantage for pursuing 
security under anarchy”. [1: 161] Balancing can take four different forms: it can be either 
positive balancing (by increasing a state’s own power versus its rival) or negative balancing 
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(by undermining the rival’s relative power versus itself); and either military balancing or 
non-military balancing. [1]
Stephen Walt argues that states tend to balance against the most threatening country. 
Walt identifies four factors that will affect the level of threat that states may pose: aggregate 
power, proximity, offensive capability and offensive intentions. [2: 9]
Given the increased Russian offensive capabilities, Moscow’s demonstrated offensive 
intentions, the two countries’ geographical proximity and their shared history (they fought 
not less than twelve wars against one another), one would expect Turkey to take serious 
measures to counter Russia. Nonetheless, Turkey’s threat perceptions regarding Russia seem 
to be aligned more closely with Hungary and Bulgaria among the Eastern Flank countries 
than with the threat perceptions of Poland, Romania and the Baltic states. The yearly survey 
of the Kadir Has University of the Turkish security perceptions reinforces this argument: in 
2018 Turks saw Russia only the seventh most threatening country to Turkey (after the U.S., 
Israel, the EU countries, Syria, Armenia and Greece). However, this perception is volatile. 
In 2016, during the jet crisis, Russia suddenly became the second most threatening country 
to Turkey in the eyes of the Turkish people. [3]
The only time when Ankara had asked for additional troop deployment, was the period 
when the Turkish–Russian relations were strained (November 2015–June 2016) due to the 
downing of the Russian Su–24 aircraft. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reportedly 
told NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg before the July 2016 Warsaw Summit that: 
“The Black Sea has almost become a Russian lake. If we don’t take action, history will not 
forgive us.” [4] This request has however not been repeated after the normalization of ties 
with Moscow.
The Importance of the Black Sea
The Black Sea region is usually not in the centre of debates when it comes to countering 
Russia. It is usually the Baltics, although, the aggressive Russian intentions have manifested 
so far almost exclusively around the Black Sea. The first one happened in 2008 with the 
war in Georgia then with the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. The so called “frozen 
conflicts” of Moldova and Nagorno–Karabakh are also located in this area.
Nevertheless, the Black Sea plays an important role for several international actors. 
The region is part of Moscow’s traditional “near abroad”, where Russia perceives any 
enhanced Western presence as a direct threat to its state’s survival. For Moscow, the Black 
Sea is a crucial buffer zone against the West. This is one of the main reasons why even 
the theoretical accession of Georgia and Ukraine to NATO is under no circumstances 
acceptable for Moscow. Furthermore, the Black Sea is an important window for accessing 
the warm waters of the Mediterranean and projecting power into the surrounding regions.
NATO’s eastern and southern flank intersect at the Black Sea. The Alliance has three 
littoral members (Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey), whose defence it is responsible for, and 
two partner countries (Ukraine, Georgia) around the Black Sea.
For Turkey, the region has a historical significance. Between 1475 and 1774 the Black 
Sea was regarded as an inner Ottoman lake. Today Turkey is still one of the most dominant 
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Black Sea powers. Additionally, the 1936 Montreux Convention3 makes Turkey the 
gatekeeper of the Black Sea, thus provides a special status and responsibility for Ankara. 
The Black Sea (and Georgia) are important buffer zones for Turkey vis-à-vis the historic 
rival Russia. Besides, there are several Turkic-origin people (Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian 
Turks, Gagauz) living around the Black Sea, whose protection is also a priority for Ankara. 
The Turkish Naval Forces (TNF) Command adopted a new Naval Forces Strategy [5] in 
2015, which was published for the first time ever. This decision implies both the growing 
importance of the maritime domain in general for Turkey, and the large extent of the 
perceived change in the country’s maritime security environment.
From an economic point of view, the Black Sea is a key transit corridor for energy 
resources, which makes it more significant for every actor. The stability around the Black 
Sea is necessary to ensure the security of the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) between 
the several regions it intersects: the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Middle 
East.
The Changing Security Environment around  
the Black Sea
After the Cold War a peaceful environment and various forms of regional cooperation (Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation since 1992, BLACKSEAFOR since 2001, Black Sea Harmony 
since 2004) dominated the region, however the wars in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria have 
remilitarized the Black Sea. Besides the different interests of the coastline countries, the 
conflicts gained a bipolar frame. The West and Russia are facing each other again, in terms 
of both their different integration schemes they have offered to the states in the region and 
their physical force presence.
After the annexation of Crimea, the military balance has dramatically changed in favour 
of Russia and created a new security environment. Now, Russia’s Black Sea coastline 
(1171 km) is almost as long as Turkey’s (1329 km). Although the modernization plan of 
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet outlined in the 2011–2020 State Armament Program has not been 
fulfilled as originally thought (Moscow plans to deploy 30 new warships in addition to the 
existing 47 by 2020), it has achieved remarkable results. Russia has introduced new ships 
(including three Admiral Grigorovich class frigates), submarines (including six new Project 
636.3 diesel submarines) and aircraft (including 12 new Su–30SM). Since 2014, Crimea 
has also been completely militarized: among others, four battalions of S–400 air defence 
system, Bastion and Bal missiles and Nebo–M radars have been deployed on the peninsula. 
Moscow has established an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) zone covering almost the 
whole Black Sea, particularly when it comes to air defence. [6]
3 The Montreux Convention regulates international naval access to the Black Sea. The treaty gives Turkey 
sovereign rights over the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits (Turkish Straits) in wartime.
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AIR-DEFENSE ANTI-SHIP LAND-ATTACK
Figure 1. Russia’s anti-access area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in November 2018: 
Air Defence: S–300 and S–400 systems; Naval strike: SS–N–27 Sizzler anti-ship missiles, 
SS–N–30 (Kalibr) LACM; Land-based strike: Iskander–M SRBM. [7]
Russia is militarily active around the Black Sea as well. An additional S–300 missile 
system was deployed in Abkhazia in 2017. Russia delivered Iskander–E systems to Armenia 
in 2016 and S–300 systems to the Syrian regime in 2018. Additionally, Moscow secured its 
military presence in Syria. In 2017 Russia extended the lease of its naval base in Tartus and 
its Khmeimim Air Base by a further 49 years. Among others, S–400 systems, Pantsir–S1 
and Pantsir–S2 systems, and Iskander–M systems have been deployed to the country. 
The majority of Russian armaments and ammunition used in Syria has been delivered 
from the Russian Black Sea port in Novorossiysk to Tartus through the Turkish Straits (this 
route is often referred to as the Syrian Express).
As a result, Turkey is practically encircled by Russia. The changes in the region and the 
altered power balance are not in Turkey’s favour. In spite of this, Ankara has given only 
a muted response to the Russian expansion. What is more, in April 2017 the Turkish Navy 
conducted a bilateral exercise with the Russian Navy. [8]
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How Have NATO And Turkey Responded to the Russian 
Annexation of Crimea?
Regarding their political rhetoric both NATO and Turkey condemned the Russian aggression 
in Ukraine. NATO considers the annexation of Crimea “illegal and illegitimate”, which 
the member states “do not and will not recognize”. [9] [10] [11] The Alliance condemned 
“Russia’s ongoing and wide-ranging military build-up in Crimea” and is “concerned by 
Russia’s efforts and stated plans for further military build-up in the Black Sea region”. [10] 
Without Turkey’s consent, these declarations could not have been accepted. Turkish 
politicians have rhetorically made their view on the war in Ukraine clear several times 
in line with NATO’s official position. Erdogan, for example stated in November 2018 at 
a joint press conference with his Ukrainian counterpart Petro Poroshenko, that “we strongly 
reiterated the stance with regard to the preservation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political unity. We once again stressed that we do not, and will not, recognize 
the illegal annexation of Crimea.” [12]
On the other hand, Turkey is the only NATO member that has not joined Western 
sanctions against Russia. Among the EU candidates, besides Turkey, Serbia and Macedonia 
are the only ones who have rejected to join the sanctions. [13] Ankara did not expel any 
Russian diplomat either, in retaliation for the poisoning of former intelligence operative 
Sergei Skripal. Although, even the EU was not unified in this latter case: only 19 EU 
member states did. [14]
After the Wales Summit, NATO focused mainly on the northern part of the eastern 
flank, but after the 2016 Summit in Warsaw, the Alliance has also stepped up its activity 
in the Black Sea and agreed to develop a tailored forward presence there. The tailored 
forward presence encompasses air, land, and maritime components. [15] The core of the 
land presence is the multinational brigade deployed in Romania. Allies have contributed to 
the protection of the airspace of Romania and Bulgaria. Standing NATO maritime forces 
are present with more ships and more naval exercises in the region. Besides, the cooperation 
with Georgia and Ukraine has also intensified after 2014.
Ankara did not veto any of the proposed measures. Turkey has continued participating 
in multinational military exercises even after the Russian annexation of Crimea, including 
the Romanian-led yearly Sea Shield and the U.S. and Ukrainian co-hosted yearly Sea Breeze 
naval exercises. Turkey also maintained its participation in NATO’s Standing Maritime 
Group (SNMG2).
However, there are certain limitations for NATO in enhancing its military presence. 
The 1936 Montreux Convention limits the presence of non-littoral powers in the Black 
Sea. The treaty establishes tonnage restrictions (15,000 tons) on vessels of war that seek 
passage through the Turkish Straits. The 2008 war in Georgia has already demonstrated 
what this restriction can imply in practice. During the war, Turkey barred two U.S. 
hospital vessels from crossing through the Bosporus in line with the treaty’s tonnage limit. 
Furthermore, according to the Convention: “Vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea 
Powers shall not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever be the object 
of their presence there”. [16] This is why non-littoral NATO states are forced to maintain 
rotational rather than permanent presence.
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Consequently, the littoral NATO members’ maritime development is needed for a more 
significant permanent presence. The idea of reflagging non-littoral NATO ships may also 
arise but given the historical experiences, it will be very difficult to convince Turkey about 
it. [17] The Ottoman Empire was dragged into the first World War thanks to two reflagged 
German ships (Goeben and Breslau, renamed to Yavuz Sultan Selim and Midilli), which, 
having escaped the British and entered the Straits, attacked Russian ports ordered by their 
German commander. [18: 348–349] One must also take into account that Russia would 
surely react very sensitively to any reflagging.
Among the littoral NATO members, Romania is the one who has been pushing for 
a bigger NATO, and if that is not possible then American military presence actively, while 
Bulgaria and Turkey are very lukewarm about it. In 2016, Bucharest proposed a permanent 
NATO Black Sea Fleet. Bulgaria did not support the idea and declared it would not join. 
Thus, the proposal was taken off the agenda. The Turkish position on the initiative has never 
been clearly articulated. [19]
In parallel with developments in NATO, Turkey has been modernizing its naval forces. 
In July 2017, Turkey inaugurated the corvette Kınalıada, equipped to fight submarines. In 
the same year, Turkey received two Bayraktar class Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) and started 
the construction of a new class (Istanbul class) of frigates. [20] In December 2018, the 
Turkish Ministry of National Defence announced the construction of a new naval base on 
the Black Sea coast in Trabzon province. The Turkish Navy currently has a total of eight 
bases in the four seas, this will be the ninth one. [21]
However, this modernization project shows a continuity rather being an adaptation of 
Ankara’s maritime strategy as a response to the annexation of Crimea. [22] The Turkish 
Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM) published its Defence Industry Sectoral 
Strategy Document in 2009 for the period of 2009−2016. The document envisaged ambitious 
development plans for the maritime sector, focusing mostly on indigenous production. [23] 
The next sectoral strategy (2018−2022) only continued this line. [44]
Considering our first research question, we cannot state that Turkey has done significantly 
less than other NATO member countries. Ankara has not raised unilateral vetoes, and 
contributed to the common actions. The improvement of NATO capabilities in general is in 
Turkey’s interest. For Ankara, it is even better, if it is directed against no one specifically. 
The new Turkish Naval Forces Strategy refers to NATO several times, and highlights the 
importance of „participation in and contribution to NATO-initiated miscellaneous activities 
concerning security related issues”. [5: 11]
Examining Turkey’s Balancing Choices
As for balancing, Turkey has taken positive military and non-military balancing actions. 
Besides investing in its military, Turkey has intensified cooperation with Ukraine [24] 
and Moldova, [25] and the Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey trilateral formation has remained 
active as well. [26] On the other hand, limited, if any, negative balancing measures can 
be observed by Turkey. Ankara’s balancing actions through the West (positive external 
military balancing) have remained limited as well. On the rhetorical/normative side, Turkey 
sided with NATO and condemned certain Russian actions. Yet, Ankara has not joined 
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Western sanctions and does not ask for additional NATO presence, even if the Russian 
military build-up is alarming. Furthermore, Ankara has also continued its cooperation with 
Moscow in other areas, for example in the settlement process in Syria and the procurement 
of the S–400 system. This way we cannot talk about strategic non-cooperation as a negative 
balancing tool, either.
In this section we will examine Ankara’s balancing choices. We are taking a Western 
perspective, and looking for answers for two questions: why Turkey 1.) does not balance 
negatively, namely that it does not join the sanctions and does not challenge Russia in the 
Black Sea; and 2.) does not balance externally against Russia through the West, that it does 
not ask for additional NATO deployment, and is lukewarm about the enhanced Western 
presence.
In choosing different balancing strategies, threat perception is the most decisive 
factor. Additionally, states consider at least two issues: the effectiveness and the cost of 
balancing. [1] In line with this, we divide the possible arguments into three groups.
Issues of Threat Perceptions
Different Threat Prioritization
Ankara simply prioritizes threats differently than the West. The threat posed by Kurdish 
separatism and a West versus Russia collision is more imminent and threatening for Ankara 
right now than the Russian expansion. Syria is the main focus of the Turkish leaders, which 
also means that they concentrate all of their resources in that direction instead of the Black 
Sea. If Ankara wants to achieve results and secure its interests in Syria, it has no chance 
but to accommodate either Washington or Moscow. And since the normalization of bilateral 
ties in 2016, Russia seems to be more open to take into consideration the Turkish concerns, 
than the country’s traditional Western allies—even if Ankara understands that it can be 
abandoned by Moscow any time.4
This point does not necessarily imply that Turkey does not fear Russia at all. To put 
it differently, based on the model of Steven R. David called omnibalancing, [27] it can 
be argued that Turkey is collaborating with “the second most important” threat in order 
to fight more effectively the perceived “number one” threat, namely the Kurds. The fight 
against Kurdish “terrorism” is important from a political perspective as well. Nationalist 
sentiments have been helping the Turkish governing elite to stay in power.
Sticking to the (Mis)Perceived Status Quo and the Montreux Convention
With the Russian military build-up following the annexation of Crimea, Turkey lost its 
clear lead as the largest military power in the region. According to many, Ankara is sticking 
to a status quo that no longer exists, thus the Turkish argument of maintaining the power 
4 The analysis of the war in Syria is beyond the scope of this case study. Nonetheless, the importance of the 
Syrian conflict in the context of the Turkish–Russian–American relations cannot be exaggerated. For a more 
detailed overview, see e.g. [30].
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balance is based on a “reality-denying position”. [28] On the other hand, as a study of the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute points out, “the Turkish Navy as a whole 
(which is in or near the Black Sea) remains larger than the Russian Black Sea Fleet”. [29]
The Montreux Convention is another reason why Turkey is sticking to the status quo. 
The Turkish maritime strategy also underlines that “Turkey has given utmost importance 
to the preservation of the Montreux Regime”. [5: 10] Ankara is against any amendment of 
the treaty which grants Turkey sovereignty over the Straits. The abolition of the Convention 
could be perceived as a bigger threat to Turkey than the current Russian deployment.
Regional Ownership Approach
The regional ownership approach is considered the traditional Turkish position in the region. 
In the words of the former foreign minister and prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu, this 
approach suggests finding “regional solutions to the regional problems, rather than waiting 
for other actors from outside the region to impose their own solutions”. [31] This principle 
can be observed in the Turkish behaviour after the Cold War. This motivated the creation of 
regional organizations and initiatives, such as BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmony, 
which was supposed to send the message that there is no need for the destabilizing presence 
of the United States in the region. The Turkish Naval Forces Strategy also refers to the 
principle of regional ownership: “Turkey continues to show sensitivity to the maintenance 
of the ‘sense of regional ownership’ and the regional security initiatives established in this 
context.” [5: 10]
Framing the Ongoing Conflict as a Conflict Between Russia and the West
Gülnur Aybet, a senior adviser to Erdogan said about the conflict in Ukraine that “Turkey 
knows this is something between Russia and the West […] and it will keep quiet and let 
them work it out”. [32] Turkey tries to stay impartial and does not want to take a side in 
a conflict that is seen as a conflict between Russia and the West. Erdogan has made it clear 
already at the time of the Georgian war. In September 2008 he stated: “It would not be right 
for Turkey to be pushed toward any side. Certain circles want to push Turkey into a corner 
either with the United States or Russia after the Georgian incident. One of the sides is our 
closest ally, the United States. The other side is Russia, with which we have an important 
trade volume. We would act in line with what Turkey’s national interests require.” [33] 
Turkey fears the possible escalation of conflict in the Black Sea region. The presence of more 
NATO troops in the region would threaten with even the unintended escalation of tensions, 
which is something Turkey intends to avoid. In such a scenario Ankara would be forced to 
clearly take a side, and could not maintain its current balancing stance.
Assessment of NATO Guarantees
Opinions differ on the assessment of NATO guarantees. Paradoxically, Turkey’s 
unwillingness to bolster its military presence could be a sign of trust in NATO guarantees. 
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Turkey is not afraid of a Russian military attack because of the ensured collective defence. 
The contrary is also possible. Ankara perceives a lack of credibility from its allies and 
doubts the Western commitment to the region. As Dimitar Bechev puts it: “In a worst-case 
scenario, Ankara would be left to fend alone against resurgent Russia. Therefore, it chose to 
bandwagon with Moscow.” [33]
Issues of Effectiveness
Avoiding the Security Dilemma
As John Herz puts it, the security dilemma is: “A structural notion in which the self-help 
attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to 
rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures 
of others as potentially threatening.” [34] Turkey does not see external balancing measures 
effective in the de-escalation of the conflict. As Mustafa Aydın, “the doyen of Black Sea 
studies in Turkey” [20] explains: “Turkey opposed moves to counter Russia openly in the 
region, mainly fearing that a cornered Russia might destabilize the region and create further 
security challenges.” [35] This view is in line with those opinions which see the Russian 
aggression as a response to the enlargement of NATO and the aggressive intentions of the 
West perceived by Moscow. [36]
Protecting the Turkic Minorities
It is often stated that Ankara should be more confrontative with Russia for the sake of the 
Turkic minorities, especially (but not exclusively) for the Crimean Tatars.5 From another 
perspective, however, Ankara needs to maintain good relations with Moscow precisely in 
order to engage the Russian leadership on the status and rights of the Turkic minorities. [37] 
A less visible Turkish support may be favourable for the Tatars, thus this way they will not 
be treated with suspicion by the locals and so avoid being regarded as a potential “fifth 
column”. [43]
Issues of Costs
Buck-Passing
Buck-passing is a situation where states avoid balancing by “counting on third parties to 
bear the costs of stopping” the aggressor. [38: 138] This behaviour stems from the collective 
action problem. In case of the security of the Black Sea, Romania is slowly becoming 
5 Tatars are not the only Turkic minority around the Sea. There are for example the Gagauz in Moldova and the 
Ahiska/Meskhetian Turks in Ukraine and Georgia. Because of the war in Ukraine about 3,000 Meskhetian 
Turks was settled in Turkey from Ukraine part of an official program. [41]
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the most important ally for the United States against Russia, which goes “with periodic 
threats of annihilation for hosting American ballistic missile defence, exercises simulating 
Romania’s invasion, and repeated violations of air space”. [39] Turkey benefits from the 
additional American deployment but takes no such direct negative consequences.
Buck-passing also gives an answer to the question why Turkey has not joined the 
Western sanctions: it provides Ankara economic benefits. In spite of the clear rhetoric 
on supporting the territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine, and despite the Western 
sanctions, Turkish ships have been trading with Abkhazia and Crimea. Turkey has been 
attempting to build close relationship with every actor in the region, including Russia and 
Ukraine simultaneously, and this way minimize the costs of the war. From a definitional 
point of view, it could even be questioned, whether sanctions can be considered as real 
balancing actions, because the introduction of sanctions would probably result in not an 
increase but a decrease in Turkey’s relative power versus Russia: considering the effects 
of the expected Russian counter-sanctions, the Turkish economy would likely suffer more 
strikingly.6
Energy Dependency
In 2008, Turkey emphasized its energy dependence on Russia. It was the main argument of 
its unwillingness in taking a harsh stance against Moscow. Today the situation is different. 
Turkey is facing a new energy environment. In the words of Chris Miller, “the era of the 
West and Russia clashing over pipeline projects is being supplanted by a new, more flexible 
energy regime. Russia’s energy leverage is declining. […] Turkey was in the past dependent 
on Russian gas, but it is increasingly Gazprom that will depend on Turkish transit.” [40] 
Turkey hopes to become an energy hub. It may decrease the extent of asymmetry and its 
dependence on Russia. It is also worth noting that the Russian “energy weapon” has its 
own limits. After the downing of the Russian fighter jet by a Turkish pilot is 2015, Moscow 
introduced several serious sanctions against Ankara, but the issue of stopping the gas transit 
to Turkey did not even emerge as an option. These are the reasons why we do not consider 
energy dependency the decisive factor here.
Conclusion
In spite of the several disputes between Turkey and other NATO members it cannot be 
stated that Turkey is turning away from the West in strategic terms. Ankara has contributed 
to NATO actions after 2014 which helped preserve its credibility within the Alliance.
Yet, Turkey has given only limited balancing responses to the increased Russian threat 
in the Black Sea region, though the Russian activity is contrary to its interests. Turkey 
has taken positive military and non-military balancing actions but limited, if any, negative 
6 After the shooting down of the Russian Su–24 aircraft by Turkey, Moscow introduced harsh sanctions in 
response. Turkish–Russian bilateral trade contracted by a third from USD 23.9 billion in 2015 to USD 16.8 
billion in 2016. Turkey lost over 1% of GDP. [42]
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balancing measures can be identified. Ankara is traditionally very cautious of balancing 
against Moscow openly through the West and prefers regional options instead.
There are several reasons of choosing this balancing mix. First, Turkey’s threat 
perceptions differ from other NATO countries’ to a large extent. It is important to understand 
these perceptions since a more effective cooperation within the Alliance is achievable only 
this way. The threat posed by Kurdish separatism, the possible amendment of the Montreux 
Convention, or a direct military clash between the West and Russia, in the case of which 
it would be forced to clearly take a side, seem to be more serious threats for Ankara at 
the moment. Secondly, the Turkish government sees certain balancing actions ineffective, 
sometimes even counterproductive. Accordingly, they could lead to an arms race, a new act 
of ‘defensive aggression’ from Moscow, increased risks of military accidents between the 
two sides and as a result they would destabilize the region even further. Thirdly, Ankara 
finds balancing disproportionately costly, and seeks economic advantages while avoiding 
sanctions.
In the short run Turkey will likely continue its current strategy. In case of a direct 
bilateral conflict with Russia, however, we can expect Turkey’s turning more closely toward 
its Western allies, as it happened after the Su–24 incident. This forecast is also supported 
by the above cited survey of the Kadir Has University: the jet crisis suddenly made Russia 
the second most threatening country to Turkey—though only temporarily. [3] Time will tell 
how it will work out in the long run. According to realist theories, Turkey as a rational actor 
must balance against Russia’s growing military posture in the Black Sea, if it does not want 
to put its state’s survival at risk.
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